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After Over-Privileged Permissions: Using 
Technology and Design to Create Legal Compliance 
ANJANETTE RAYMOND, JONATHAN SCHUBAUER, AND DHRUV MADAPPA*©  
ABSTRACT 
Consumers in the mobile ecosystem can putatively protect their privacy with the use 
of application permissions. However, this requires the mobile device owners to 
understand permissions and their privacy implications.  Yet, few consumers 
appreciate the nature of permissions within the mobile ecosystem, often failing to 
appreciate the privacy permissions that are altered when updating an app. Even 
more concerning is the lack of understanding of the wide use of third-party libraries, 
most which are installed with automatic permissions, that is permissions that must 
be granted to allow the application to function appropriately. Unsurprisingly, many 
of these third-party permissions violate consumers’ privacy expectations and 
thereby, become “over-privileged” to the user. Consequently, an obscurity of privacy 
expectations between what is practiced by the private sector and what is deemed 
appropriate by the public sector is exhibited. 
Despite the growing attention given to privacy in the mobile ecosystem, legal 
literature has largely ignored the implications of mobile permissions. This article 
seeks to address this omission by analyzing the impacts of mobile permissions and 
the privacy harms experienced by consumers of mobile applications. The authors 
call for the review of industry self-regulation and the overreliance upon simple 
notice and consent. Instead, the authors set out a plan for greater attention to be 
paid to socio-technical solutions, focusing on better privacy protections and 
technology embedded within the automatic permission-based application 
ecosystem. 
INTRODUCTION 
Most lawyers recall with a level of fondness the series of shrink-wrap cases, 
founded in somewhat extensional twists of the law at the time. The law landed on 
the determination that a customer can buy software and agree to the primary terms 
of use prior to its installation, and as purchasers retain the option to return software 
once they see the terms inside the box. The cases slowly came to a somewhat 
reasonable line of legal business efficiency. 
Fast forward to today’s world, software–at least on a disk in a box–is a thing of 
the past, and the ability to download a piece of software is ubiquitous. One might 
 After Over-Privileged Permissions 
68 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
assume, those tried and true cases of old still lead the reasoning, but you would 
likely be surprised. While downloading applications are still subject to terms of use, 
buried inside the download, and rarely mentioned in the fine print, are the series 
of third-party libraries installed with automatic permissions–that is permissions 
that must be granted to allow the application to function appropriately.  
In addition to such libraries, applications use these third-party permissions in 
ways that may violate consumers’ privacy expectations and thereby, become over-
privileged to the user. For example, Silverpush, an advertising company, developed 
a mobile ad library repository that passively listened for ultrasonic audio beacons 
to track users TV viewing activities.1 Similarly, Facebook was recently awarded a 
patent for utilizing a mobile device’s camera to analyze users’ emotions while they 
are browsing their newsfeeds.2 In such instances, these third-party libraries are 
granted over-privileged permissions to collect advertising information, without any 
notification to inform the consumer. Of course, these are just a couple of the more 
nefarious examples, consider an application that provides up-to-date weather, or 
traffic, or locations of friends.3 These applications are often drawing information 
from other databases–and are aggregating the data in a real time provision.  Each 
of these external databases–or other providers of data–often want access to the 
data, both stored and generated.  
While most individuals may be comfortable with sharing such data, individuals 
are unaware of the privacy risks they consensually agreed upon. Consumers are 
blindly conforming to the blanketed disclosures, while coupled with their lack of 
understanding of the inner workings of how their technology may be used in their 
daily routines. Thus, we have since returned our society to the days of the 
uncertainty of the law in the face of shrink-wrap clauses. 
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 1. See Dan Goodin, More Android Phones than ever are Covertly Llistening for Inaudible Sounds in ads, 
ARS TECHNICA (May 5, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/05/theres-a-
spike-in-android-apps-that-covertly-listen-for-inaudible-sounds-in-ads/. 
 2. See Minda Zetlin, Facebook Is Patenting Technology to Spy on You Through Your Smartphone Camera 
and Microphone, INC. (June 25, 2018), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/facebook-patents-spying-
smartphone-camera-microphone-privacy.html. 
 3. See W. Enck et al., A Study of Android Application Security, in PROC. OF THE 20TH USENIX SECURITY 
SYMPOSIUM (2011); see also Glen Urban & Fareena Sultan, The Case for ‘Benevolent’ Mobile Apps, 56 MIT SLOAN 
MGMT. REV. 31, 31–37 (2015) (describing how the “free Sea Tow app supports boaters’ navigation needs by 
offering information about local tide tables, detailed marine weather forecasts, GPS coordinates and bearing, 
and speed.”). 
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Consequently, it’s time to revisit the approach that was developed in response 
to shrink-wrap issues, one that recognizes the importance of balancing law and 
business interests. This article will explore a governance regime for the consumer 
driven digital world. The paper asserts that regulation must be designed with key 
features in mind: legal compliance, technology as a driver, the seamless, 
unobtrusiveness, and transparent, processes, focused on creating balances 
between business interests and the need to regulate. The paper will accomplish this 
by demonstrating consent by design deployed in the automatic permission-based 
application ecosystem. 
In 1994, the first smartphone was launched by IBM’s Simon Model.4 It had over 
10 inbuilt applications and there was no iOS or Google app stores for consumers to 
download additional applications. The phone came preloaded with generic 
productivity apps like the Address Book, Calendar, Mail, Note Pad and Sketch Pad. 
Although not known as “applications,” but instead “features” these developments 
were the first signs of what was to come in the mobile application environment.5 
Fast-forward to 2008, the Apple AppStore went live, featuring over 500 iOS 
applications. There were over ten million apps downloaded within the first week  
highlighting the massive market potential of mobile apps, with numerous amounts 
of these applications offered as what many consumers considered as “free.”6 One 
month later, Google would announce the Android Market and would make it 
available for Android users within a few months of the Apple AppStore release.7 
Android Market would later become known as Google Play, which then merged all 
Android application markets into one store to support the mass market of users.8 
 With the AppStore and Google Play Store now serving millions of people 
internationally, individual app downloads reached hundreds of millions in the first 
month. Applications were soon categorized by their intended purpose (game, 
lifestyle, productivity, etc.), which was distinguished by both the description and 
 
 4. See Ira Sager, Before iPhone and Android Came Simon, the First Smartphone, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2012, 
8:50 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-29/before-iphone-and-android-came-simon-
the-first-smartphone. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Caroline McCarthy, Apple: One million iPhones sold, 10 million App Store downloads in first 
weekend, CNET (July 15, 2008, 7:13 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-one-million-iphones-sold-10-
million-app-store-downloads-in-first-weekend/.  
 7. See Dean Takahashi, Google Releases Details on Android Market Launch, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 22, 2008, 
9:25 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2008/10/22/google-releases-details-on-android-market-launch/;see also, 
e.g., Chris Velazco, Goodbye Android Market, Hello Google Play, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 6, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2012/03/06/goodbye-android-market-hello-google-play/. 
 8. See Ron Amadeo, Google launches the Google Store, a new Place to buy Hardware, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 
11, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/03/google-launches-the-google-store-a-new-
second-place-to-buy-hardware/.  
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the core functions of what the app intended to use from the smartphone device.9 
The core functionality of applications introduced a need for consumers to be 
notified what they were agreeing to when downloading and using a mobile app. 
These notification and consent needs formed what would become the mobile 
application permission model.10 
The article is structured as follows. Part I offers a description of what the 
permission system represents for both the Android and iOS operating systems. Part 
II then focus on the application technology of permission systems with an emphasis 
on over-privileged permissions. Subsequently, an analysis of the legislative flaws 
and failings of regulating third-party services in modern technology is then offered 
in Part III. Part IV reveals third-party permission practices and violations of privacy 
in mobile applications. Part V overviews the current U.S. privacy legislation and 
industry regulations in place. Finally, Part VI concludes the article with a discussion 
of potential guidelines mobile developers could adopt, and the need for a 
sociotechnical & legal reconstructive approach to help provide consumers with the 
protections to promote consumer privacy. 
I. HOW PERMISSION SYSTEMS ARE MODELED: A DESIGN PRIMER  
While basic permission models have been around in some form since computers 
were distributed,11 the mobile permission system has been flawed by design since 
its conception.12 A case in point is the automatic process by which some permissions 
of mobile applications are allowed. In most cases, there are too many permissions 
included in an application that do not align with its intended purpose. Even more 
alarming, the consumers have very little choice in what the application can access 
on their smartphone. The transparency that is provided within notice and disclosure 
forms is also presented at an excessive length that is written broadly in legal 
language that the consumer may not understand. Simply put, the consumer has 
limited choice and control with their information in the mobile application 
ecosystem. A more thoughtful representation of transparency is needed if we want 
to provide consumers with adequate means of protecting and controlling their 
 
 9. See, e.g., Play Console Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-
developer/answer/113475?hl=en (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (describing the different categories and descriptions 
for applications in the Google Play Store). 
 10. See Permissions Overview, ANDROID, 
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (“Android apps 
must request permission to access sensitive user data (such as contacts and SMS), as well as certain system 
features (such as camera and internet). Depending on the feature, the system might grant the permission 
automatically or might prompt the user to approve the request.”). 
 11. See David F. Ferraiolo & D. Richard Kuhn, Role-Based Access Control, in 15TH NAT’L COMPUTER  SECURITY 
CONF., Oct. 1992, at 554–63 (“The current set of security criteria, criteria interpretations, and guidelines has 
grown out of research and development efforts on the part of the DoD over a period of twenty plus years.”). 
 12. See Franziska Roesner et al., User-Driven Access Control: Rethinking Permission Granting in Modern 
Operating Systems, in PROC. OF THE 2012 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY, May 2012, at 224. 
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personal information. First, though, it is important to understand the way in which 
the permission model works and to distinguish the differences of the Android and 
iOS permission systems.  
A. Understanding Permission Norms 
To uncover the foundations of what makes a permission system, consider the 
general formality of asking permission for something. When we do this task, what 
we are really doing is providing the recipient of our conversation a degree of notice 
to what we are requesting and then waiting for our request to receive consensual 
agreement.13 If the recipient party consensually provides permission to a request, 
the party who initially asked permission to do a task is permitted to conduct 
whatever was requested.14 Similarly, if the party who is asked permission by a 
requester does not agree with what is being asked, the recipient of the request may 
choose to deny permission from completing a task.15  
The mobile permission system generally tries to mimic this formal process, but 
with a degree of difficulty. The formal permission process of human-to-human 
interaction often entails a single request, followed by a mutual agreement or 
disagreement.16 Conversely, the mobile permission process includes several 
permissions in a single request.17 For example, if the recipient downloading an 
application is asked by an application permission to use a feature, the recipient is 
typically agreeing to more than one permission in a single request.  
This can be problematic since the recipient is not informed of the additional 
permissions they are agreeing to. In the same example, if the recipient of the 
permission request does not agree to grant permission to the application, the 
mobile app may refuse to download and thereby, render the services impossible to 
be used. Hence, consumers downloading applications are met with a “take it or 
leave” ultimatum. Enter the mobile permission system and how applications 
address the formal permission process.  
B. How the Mobile Permission System Works 
Permission systems for mobile platforms are described as “user-centric,”18 where 
the consumer using the app makes the first decision about granting permission to 
 
 13. See generally The Basics of Getting Permission, STAN. U. LIBR., 
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/introduction/getting-permission/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (outlining 
the basic steps for obtaining permission). 
 14. Id.  
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See generally Adrienne Porter Felt et al., How to Ask for Permission, in PROC. OF THE 7TH USENIX CONF. ON 
HOT TOPICS IN SECURITY, 2012, at 4 (discussing various platforms’ permission systems). 
 18. See Mohammad Nauman et al., Realization of a User-Centric, Privacy Preserving Permission Framework 
for Android, 8 SECURITY COMM. NETWORKS 368, 369 (2014). 
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an application at the installation stage.19 The core functionality of the permission 
system is to allow consumers to regulate access to sensitive data on mobile 
devices,20 such as address book contacts, location information, and text messages. 
These permissions granted by the consumer are then applied to all subsequent 
cases of the same app accessing the device.21 
The permission systems of Android and iOS applications were intended to 
provide consumers with general notice to what features an application may use 
when it is functioning.22 For instance, applications cannot simply access and turn on 
a consumer’s camera. Instead, the application must first be granted permission by 
the consumer during the installation process,23 so the person using the app can 
distinguish if the ability to access the camera is reasonable within the applications 
purpose. Whether the camera should be appropriately used is determined within 
the reasoning of the applications functionality. Snapchat, for example, would 
reasonably need permission to use the camera feature.24 
 In a privacy tech utopia, consumers would be given unlimited choice and control 
over their data. However, the platform on the mobile device must make implicit 
assumptions for the consumer so that the core elements of the applications may 
run properly.25 For instance, if a consumer had to accept or decline every function 
on an application, the process may exhaust the consumer’s patience and render the 
importance of the permissions messages useless. The permission description may 
not be read and the habituation of a quick acceptance out of convenience is more 
likely.26 
 
 19. See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., Android Permissions Demystified, in PROC. OF THE 18TH ACM CONF. ON 
COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY, Oct. 2011, at 627 (declaring up front the required permissions, apps allow notify 
users about the received permissions). 
 20. See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension, and Behavior, in 
PROC. OF THE EIGHTH SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY, July 2012 (“In order to protect Android users, applications’ 
access to phone resources is restricted with permissions.”). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE, CHAPTER 8 
BREAKING RULES FOR GOOD (2009) (discussing information sharing is the primary threat to privacy in today’s 
technological society); see generally Android Permissions, SNAPCHAT (last visited Oct. 14, 2019), 
https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/android-permissions (explaining that Snapchat must be given 
permission from user to access camera). 
 25. See generally Rebecca Balebako, et al., The Impact of Timing on the Salience of Smartphone App Privacy 
Notices, in PROC. OF THE 5TH ANN. ACM CCS WORKSHOP ON SECURITY & PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONES & MOBILE DEVICES, Oct. 
2015, at 63, at 63–74 (2015) (discussing the effects of privacy notices on participants in a study). 
 26. See generally Soyun Kim & Michael S. Wogalter, Habituation, Dishabituation, and Recovery Effects in 
Visual Warnings, in 53 PROC. OF THE HUMAN FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOCIETY ANN. MEETING 1612, 1612–16 (2009) 
(finding that participants in a study became less alert to the presence of privacy warnings the more exposed 
they were to such warnings). 
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On the other hand, the consumer may not be sufficiently knowledgeable to 
understand which permission must be used in order to allow the application to 
function correctly.27 To avoid these issues, the permission system provisions  to 
automatic approval of different types of permissions at both the installation and 
runtime.28 While both Android and iOS use mobile permission models similarly, 
each has a distinctively different permission system.29 It is worth highlighting the 
core differences in the two major mobile ecosystems. Firstly, the use of intents–a 
mechanism in Android which allows applications to internally exchange 
information–facilitates a large part of app development in the android permission 
environment.30 This mechanism does not exist in iOS, since URL Schemes dictate 
iOS inter-app communication. To put it simply, these two mobile operating systems 
communicate to their applications differently. Secondly, the developer 
environments are inherently distinctive. Android development is encapsulated in 
an open-source environment, while iOS is produced in a closed source system. 
Moreover, these distinctions create special security issues that could result in 
privacy risks.  
Since the development process is very different, tackling the privacy issues 
ensued by their similar permission models becomes complicated. Within the 
Android system, permissions are requested by the application developer, 
incorporated into the application package,31 and then approved by the user when 
the application has been installed.32 While this may seem simple, it is not. In fact, 
the Android Application Platform Interface (“API”) currently contains more than 130 
varying permissions the developers can implement.33   
 
 27. See Haoyu Wang, et al., 2017. Understanding the Purpose of Permission Use in Mobile Apps. 35 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYSTEMS, July 2017, at 2–6, 31 (“Understanding the purpose of why sensitive data [on our 
phones] is accessed could help improve privacy as well as enable new kinds of access control.”). 
 28. See id. at 4 (explaining certain permissions must be accepted at install time). 
 29. See Zinaida Benenson, et al., Android and iOS Users’ Differences Concerning Security and Privacy, in 
CHI’13 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 817, 819 (“compar[ing] Android and iOS users 
according to their demographic differences, security and privacy awareness, and reported behavior when 
installing apps.”). 
 30. See generally Intents and Intent Filters, ANDROID, 
https://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters (last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (providing 
information on the various types of intents and intent filters). 
 31. See generally Android API’s, GOOGLE, https://developers.google.com/fit/android/ (last visited Sept. 18, 
2019) (explaining the Recording API provides automated storage of fitness data using subscriptions). 
 32. See generally Requesting App Permissions, ANDROID, 
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/requesting.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2019) 
(detailing the Android permission model). 
 33. See generally Permissions overview, ANDROID, 
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (explaining how 
Android application permissions work, “including: how permissions are presented to the user, the difference 
between install-time and runtime permission requests, how permissions are enforced, and the types of 
permissions and their groups.”). See also Michelle Atkinson, Apps Permissions in the Google Play Store, PEW RES. 
CTR. (last visited Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.pewinternet.org/2015/11/10/apps-permissions-in-the-google-
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Similar to Android, iOS permissions accessing sensitive data are listed by the app 
developer in the app bundle. Apps that are linked to recent releases in iOS software 
(iOS 10 and later), are now required to include the types of data in a plug-in to store 
configuration metadata in order to run.34 Users are notified of the data that is used 
by the app prior to its installation and are then prompted to grant or deny access 
to that data once the app is installed. Until the user grants access, any API calls to 
that data are blocked. However, the user is only notified the first time the app 
requests access with all subsequent API calls using existing permissions to access 
the data.35 
One drastic difference between iOS and Android is the classification of 
permissions. Android classifies the most important type of permissions as Normal 
and Dangerous.36 Normal Permissions cover areas that protect access to API calls 
that can notify users.37 However, Normal Permissions are not granted access to 
anything that could potentially harm the consumer.38 In contrast, Dangerous 
Permissions cover areas that control access to potentially harmful API calls.39 In 
general, these types of permissions are considered potentially harmful because 
certain routine permissions granted could access private information on a user’s 
device.40 Therefore, the user’s approval is required to be requested before the 
permission is granted41 and the permission can be revoked by the user at any time.42 
 
play-store/ (“Analysis of over 1 million apps in Google’s Android operating system in 2014 shows apps can seek 
235 different kinds of permissions from smartphone users. The average app asks for five permissions.”). 
 34. See generally Documentation: Contacts, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/documentation/contacts 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (detailing the Contacts framework for all Apple platforms). 
 35. See generally Device Compatibility, APPLE, 
https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeviceInformation/Reference/iOSDeviceCompa
tibility/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (providing 
information on device capability requirements). 
 36. See Developers Guide, Requesting App Permissions, supra note 32. 
 37. See Android, Permissions overview, supra note 33. 
 38. See generally William Enck et al., A study of Android application security, in PROC. OF THE 20TH USENIX 
CONF. ON SECURITY, Aug. 2011, at 21, (finding insufficient protection of privacy sensitive information and 
widespread misuse). 
 39. See Jon Howell & Stuart Schechter, What you see is what they get: Protecting Users from Unwanted 
Use of Microphones, Cameras, and Other Sensors, in WEB 2.0 SECURITY & PRIVACY, May 2010, at 5 (explaining once 
an application is granted access, it can abuse that access and gain access to personal information in a user’s 
phone). 
 40. See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., Permission Re-Delegation: Attacks and Defenses, in PROC. OF THE 20TH 
USENIX CONF. ON SECURITY, Aug. 2011, at 22 (explaining permission de-regulation occurs when an application 
performs a privileged task for an application without permissions). 
 41. See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., The Effectiveness of Application Permissions, in PROC. OF THE 2ND USENIX 
CONF. ON WEB APPLICATION DEV., June 2011, at 7 (“Application permissions offer several advantages over 
traditional user-based permissions, but these benefits rely on the assumption that applications generally 
require less than full privileges.”). 
 42. See id. 
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In contrast, iOS Apps are expected to encrypt all data in an iOS device. As such, 
accessibility to data is based upon the classification of data into four categories: 
Complete Protection; Protected Unless Open; and No Protection.43  
Files that are assigned to a Complete Protection class offer the most security to 
their data, requiring the user’s passcode and unique device identification to decrypt 
the data. Moreover, the data in this class are inaccessible once the user locks the 
device, making all data protected until the user unlocks the device again. The 
Protected Unless Open class–a slightly less protected class–is used for files that 
continue to run even while the device is locked. This function is used by apps that 
run in the background to perform certain operations, such as maintenance and data 
analytics. The No Protection Class offers the least security to the data assigned to it 
since any key required to decrypt a file in this class is stored in device memory.44 
While these automatic permission are sometimes necessary,45 these permission 
are also interconnected with third-party services embedded in the application.46 
These third-party services contain Software Development Kits that developers 
include in their application.47 The majority of the time, these additional software 
packages are necessary to maintain and operate the application.48 However, in 
other instances, third-party services are collecting advertising and behavioral 
analytics.49 The consumer is not notified of whom or what these third-parties will 
be collecting, since the permission is granted automatically at the installation 
 
 43. See iOS Security: iOS 12.3, APPLE 19–20 
https://www.apple.com/business/site/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (“When a new 
file is created on an iOS device, it’s assigned a class by the app that creates it. Each class uses different policies 
to determine when the data is accessible.”). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See generally Patrick Gage Kelley et al., A Conundrum of Permissions: Installing Applications on an 
Android Smartphone, in PROC. OF THE 16TH INT’L CONF. ON FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY, 2012, at 68 (finding 
that users are generally not well informed to decide privacy and security questions when installing applications). 
 46. See, Android Developer Website, sdkmanager, ANDROID, 
https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/sdkmanager (last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (explaining how 
to use the skdmanager command tool). See also Ilias Leontiadis  et al., Don’t kill my ads!: Balancing Privacy in 
an ad-supported Mobile Application Market, in PROC. OF THE TWELFTH WORKSHOP ON MOBILE COMPUTING SYSTEMS & 
APPLICATIONS, Feb. 2012 (“Allowing third-party applications to operate within a device holding private 
information about their owner can lead to unanticipated privacy and security risks . . .”). 
 47. See generally Google, Release notes, GOOGLE ADMOB, https://developers.google.com/admob/ios/rel-
notes (last visited Sep. 18, 2019) (detailing updates for Google AdMob since its General Availability release). 
 48. Ryan Stevens et al., Investigating user Privacy in Android ad Libraries, UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS 1, 2 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fa2c/7383769184aae4e301f0361758ae2ddb1daf.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 
2019) (2012). 
 49. See generally Michael Grace et al., Unsafe Exposure Analysis of Mobile in-app Advertisements, PROC. OF 
THE FIFTH ACM CONF. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY IN WIRELESS & MOBILE NETWORKS, Apr. 2012, at 101 (providing a study on 
the Android platform discovered that most existing ad libraries collect private information from phones that 
cannot be justified). 
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process.50 For example, Android applications exchange information from app to app 
through a process called “inter-Process Communication (“IPC”),”51 which in 
practical terms means that multiple applications can collect data and share 
resources, so long as they operating under the same service agreement on the same 
device.52  As this process became more widespread, application designers 
introduced a more seamless process called a “signature permission,” which enables 
automatic access to the same resources for applications which are signed with the 
same certificate.53  In practical terms, this means signature permissions are installed 
without notification to the user.54  Of course, this notice work around was done out 
of necessity, as these elevated privileges are primarily for maintenance and 
updates.55  
In contrast, iOS applications also cross-communicate with other applications in 
the background.  Apple applications use URL schemes to communicate from 
application to application through custom protocols developers define.56  Similar to 
the signature permission in Android, the iOS developer creates a custom URL 
scheme which may access other app systems. Once the URL scheme from another 
application accepts the handler that is passed through, the app system protocol 
permission is granted to access and communicate with libraries of another iOS 
 
 50. See Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in PROC. OF 
THE ENGAGING DATA F.: THE FIRST INT’L F. ON THE APPLICATION & MGMT. OF PERS. ELECTRONIC INFO, Oct. 2009 (explaining it 
is practically impossible to opt-out  of tracking under the current mechanism put in place by some certain ad 
networks).  
 51. Erika Chin et al., Analyzing Inter-Application Communication in Android, in PROC OF THE 9TH ACM CONF. 
ON MOBILE SYSTEMS, APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES, June-July 2011. 
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Ad Libraries and Their Apps, PROC. OF THE THIRD ACM WORKSHOP ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONES & MOBILE 
DEVICES, Nov. 2013, at 79. 
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app developers can define their own permissions, which allows the app’s resources and capabilities to be shared 
with other apps); see also <permission>, ANDROID, 
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/permission-element (last visited Sept. 13, 2019) 
(describing the component of a security permission and how a security permission may be used for more than 
one application). 
 54. See, e.g., Yuan Zhang et al., Vetting Undesirable Behaviors in Android Apps with Permission Use 
Analysis, 9 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. FORENSICS AND SECURITY 1828, 1828 (2014) (explaining that after app in 
Android grants a set of permissions upon explicit request during installment, there is no way to inspect how 
those permissions are used by the app to utilize sensitive resources). 
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process_communication/allowing_apps_and_websites_to_link_to_yoyo_content (last visited Sept. 13, 2019) 
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application.57 Furthermore, the consumer is not presented with any degree of 
notice while the data is being collected among multiple applications.  
II. OVER-PRIVILEGED PERMISSIONS 
As previously mentioned, the iOS and Android permissions are intended to provide 
consumers with the ability to control their privacy and reduce potential 
vulnerabilities in applications. However, a permission system is ineffective at 
providing proper privacy protections if developers routinely request more 
permissions than an application requires.58 It was quickly observed that the majority 
of applications on app stores requested a number of permissions that exceeded the 
scope of purpose intended to provide basic app functionality.59 Developers 
embedded additional permissions used for collecting information–like geolocation 
data and address book contacts–for tracking and behavioral marketing purposes. In 
such instances, these permissions were over-privileged to the applications intended 
function and exceeded the consumer’s privacy expectations. 
  Defining an over-privileged permission would depend on the context of the 
application itself and the scope of which the permission fails to align with its 
intended functionality of the mobile app.60 For example, a flashlight app may 
reasonably require access to the consumer’s camera on their mobile device to 
operate the necessary light component.61 If that flashlight app conjointly installs the 
read and write contact permissions, that application would potentially be violating 
consumer’s privacy expectations. The intentional purpose of the application is to 
provide a source of light, not collect contact information. Moreover, the consumer 
may be unaware that the permissions granted are accessing such data. A reasonable 
implementation of an application like a flashlight app would only need a single 
permission with two API calls—one to turn on and another to turn off the camera 
flash.62  
In the modern application market both the Google and Apple app stores are 
populated with an excess of “free” applications that routinely install over-privileged 
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permissions.63 Asking the consumer to provide permission was initially well-
intentioned by the market controllers. However, both Android’s and Apple’s 
permission systems were crafted with imminent design failures from the very 
beginning.64 The original Android permission system required the approval of every 
permission at the beginning of the installation stage. The consumer was presented 
with a list of permissions the app would require and was only left with the option 
of clicking “next” to continue the installation process.65 Denying any of the 
requested permissions was not provisioned by the developers as an option for the 
consumer. If the consumer were to “cancel” the permission list,66 the application 
would stop the downloading process,67 rendering the application unusable without 
the full approval of every listed permission. 
  Conversely, Apple’s first release of its iOS 1 mobile operating system occurred 
prior to the release of their official App Store.68 Any prior third-party applications 
downloaded by users were not authorized by Apple.69 As a result, Safari, Mail, and 
Bluetooth were incredibly vulnerable.70 Attackers easily enticed users to malicious 
web pages that allowed cross-site scripting and dialing phone numbers without user 
confirmation.71 Apple’s permission model would resemble similar components to 
the Android model,72 however, an earlier adoption to ask-on-install (“AOI”)73 would 
be implemented for users. The release of iOS 2 opened location services to third-
party applications, but prompted consumer permission first.74 While the consumer 
was granted the option of approving certain permissions, there was limited control 
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over Location Services.75 If Location Services were granted permission, all other 
apps theoretically could access the same information.76 In response to permission 
protection failures, Google and Apple developed newer developer guidelines with 
each release of their newer operating systems,77 which required developers to 
produce apps with a different permission model.78 
A. Android Developer Guidelines Evolution  
To address the shortcomings of the previous install-time permissions approach, 
Android 6.0 Marshmallow was released as the 13th version of a newer mobile 
operating system.79 The release of Marshmallow was significant, since the 
operating system would require developers to reveal dangerous permissions to the 
consumer using an AOI80 model.81 The consumer would be provided the choice of 
granting approvals of dangerous permissions upon the first installation stage, 
instead of the application automatically receiving approval of every listed 
permission without consent at install-time.82  
For the dangerous permissions, the new operating system would now prompt 
consumers at runtime when the application would attempt to access sensitive data 
for the first time.83 So, for example, if the flashlight app were to attempt to access 
contacts on a phone, the consumer would first be notified about the functionality 
and then be provided with the option to grant or deny dangerous permissions. The 
decision the consumer makes at that moment is processed for all future permission 
decisions for that specific command (i.e. the app would always deny the access to 
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read or write contacts. No further permission would be asked explicitly). While 
Marshmallow did allow the option for consumers to change their permission 
decision, the initial denial of a permission was buried within multiple levels of 
system settings. The consumer’s decision at the start of the installation process 
would dictate whether the app could access resources at all future times.84 
The modern permission model of Android applications utilizes an ask on first use 
(“AOFU”) approach.85 The consumer is prompted at each first instance the 
application attempts to access the data. The AOFU improved the previous AOI 
permission model because it gave consumers the chance to deny permissions, while 
still allowing use of the application.86 For instance, a chat application wanting to 
access the microphone at install-time may seem unreasonable to a consumer, but 
if prompted to access the microphone when a voice message is to be sent to a 
friend, the intention of the permission is communicated more clearly. The 
consumer understands that the permission is necessary to properly implement the 
function the app is attempting to use, while maintaining a reasonable degree of 
context to the functionally of the applications purpose. The consumer is provided a 
better understanding of the features that the permission enables and has more 
contextual information to be informed when making a decision. 
B. iOS Developer Guideline Evolution 
Prior to iOS 4, users had no per-app control over the Location Services function. If 
the user had the Location Services function turned on, all other apps could access 
that information as well. Besides not prompting user permission first, it did not 
indicate if another app was tracking user location.87 
Fast-forward to iOS 10, when the third-party apps downloaded by users did not 
ask the user for permissions, even if the app was accessing  user data.88 The release 
of iOS 10 saw some major changes to app permissions, increasing the responsibility 
of app developers by adding a requirement that developers would need to provide 
a description for any requested permissions of user data.89 When downloaded, 
accessing its API will launch a permission prompt to the user (or crash if no 
description is given). This includes the use of Bluetooth sharing, camera, location, 
contacts, and others.90  
 
 84. See Ahmed Alaa Al-Hamami & Mohammad Nassar, Future Challenges in Android, 5 INT’L J. OF ADVANCED 
STUD. IN COMPUTER SCI. AND ENGINEERING, 95, 97 (2016). 
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 86. See id. 
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after realizing certain apps were using their location). 
 88. See Contacts, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/documentation/contacts (last visited Dec. 13, 2019). 
 89. See iOS Security, APPLE (May 2019), 
https://www.apple.com/business/docs/site/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf. 
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Similar to Android, permissions to access data are listed by the app developer in 
the app bundle.91 Apps that are linked to recent releases in iOS software (iOS 10 
and later), are now required to include the types of data it requires in the Info.plist 
file in order to run. Users are notified of the data that is used by the app prior to its 
installation and are then prompted to grant or deny access to that data once the 
app is installed.92 Until the user grants access, any API calls to that data are blocked. 
However, the user is only notified the first time the app requests access, and any 
subsequent API calls use existing permissions to continue to access the data.93 
With regard to permissions, the OS uses a permission structure that was 
designed to prevent apps from performing unauthorized operations. In order to 
protect system integrity, all third-party apps are run as non-privileged users that is 
partitioned by the OS as “read-only,” which prevents apps from modifying system 
files or making unauthorized system calls.94 Third-party apps are also restricted by 
iOS APIs from expanding their privileges or accessing files that belong to other 
apps.95 So if a third-party app attempted to access a user’s contacts, for example, 
the user would first be prompted to provide or deny permission to the app. User 
information can only be accessed through the use of declared ‘Entitlements’ that 
are digitally signed, which are used by some of the system apps to perform specific 
privileged operations. iOS also prevents apps from accessing data from other files 
by assigning apps to a random unique home directory when they are installed.96 
Apple has also taken security measures regarding its own applications and 
programs. Apple’s virtual assistant, Siri, uses an iOS extension mechanism to verify 
a third-party app’s permissions before providing it with access to iOS protected user 
data.97 In order to prevent any exposure of user data to Apple from information 
communicated between a user’s home IoT devices and an iOS device, Apple 
introduced ‘HomeKit,’ which is a software framework infrastructure that utilizes iOS 
security to protect private data.98 
Unfortunately, the newer AOFU permission models do not solve issues with 
managing consumer privacy in mobile environments. Blanketed approval to access 
consumer data is still processed without consensual agreement. Additionally, 
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https://www.apple.com/business/docs/site/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 After Over-Privileged Permissions 
82 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
multiple third-party libraries are embedded within the majority of modern 
applications. The purpose of these libraries varies: they ease application 
development and enable features such as crash analytics, social network 
integration, and app monetization from advertisements.99 While these third-party 
services are benevolently intended to aid mobile systems, the functionality of such 
services are also largely invisible to consumers. In some instances, libraries present 
negative consequences for consumer privacy as third-party services can track 
behavior without consent, even across multiple applications on the same device.100 
Applications also continue to bury means of reasonable notice and choice with 
their third-party services.101 Information overload and use of complex legal 
language in privacy policies also continues to reinforce forced consent on the 
consumer. What is even more alarming is that once consumers agree to a forced 
disclosure agreement, U.S. law provides very few protections against third-party 
involvement.102 Moreover, as  consumers are unaware that third-party recipients 
collect their personal information and the uses to which it is put, there is virtually 
no opportunity for individuals to mitigate against privacy harm. To understand what 
privacies exist, we offer a brief description of previously defined privacy harms 
experienced by the consumer.  
C. Defining Privacy Harms 
According to Professor Calo, privacy harms can be categorized into two types of 
harm: subjective and objective privacy harm.103 Subjective harm results from 
perception of unwanted observation or surveillance, or from a feeling of 
helplessness from lack of control over the flow of personal information.104 An 
example of subjective privacy harm could be a consumer gaining knowledge of 
companies profiling information from a database that contained personal 
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information.105 Subjective privacy harm can be exhibited from the increased anxiety 
experienced by the consumer from data collection activities.106  
Objective privacy harm persists when personal information that has been 
collected and used against a consumer in an unexpected, forced manner.107 For 
example, identity theft wrongful disclosure of information, blackmail, or a 
widespread data security breach, constitute objective privacy harm.108 It is 
important to note, under Professor Calo’s definition unwanted spam, junk mail, and 
other undesired contacts are also forms of objective privacy harms, due to the 
significant amounts of time and monetary value placed on protecting against these 
types of activities.109 As consumers become aware of reports produced by media 
and online sources about the massive amounts of personal information industries 
collect and share with others multiparty members, objective privacy harm becomes 
more likely to occur because of the helplessness consumer’s face in stopping 
information exchange.110  
In contrast, subjective privacy harm occurs when a consumer’s state of anxiety 
is heightened which in turn, may alter a consumer’s routine behavior.111 As 
Professor Calo asserts, despite consumers growing awareness of  third-parties 
actively having access to their personal information, the chance of objective privacy 
harm also increases.112 The more third-parties have access to multiple forms of 
consumer information, the more likely that a consumer who has been profiled, will 
receive unwanted contacts, or be conditioned to external action that could be 
potentially harmful.  
Third parties have no obligation, aside from certain legal restrictions, to issue 
choice as an option to inform consumers as to how they will use and disclose 
collected information. What’s even more concerning from a consumer perspective 
is that such third parties may also not be implementing sufficient data security with 
the consumer’s information. Some of the information collected could be sensitive 
to the consumer and if there is a security breach, the harm is out of the consumer’s 
control. Thus, once a consumer’s personal information has been collected within an 
exhaustive policy notice system, there is little evidence the consumer has read or 
appreciates the breadth of the places where their data may end up.113 In some 
scenarios it’s possible that one of these destinations may be in the hands of third-
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party recipients that use it against a consumer in an objectively harmful manner. Or 
worse, with third parties who face a security breach with personally sensitive 
data.114  
III. MULTIPARTY INVOLVEMENT: CONSUMER PRIVACY CONCERNS  
There is a disconnect between what is consensually agreed upon by consumers and 
what data is collected by third-party members. These obscurities put consumer’s 
data at risk. Third-party security regulation varies across different industries and in 
the event of a data breach, consumers may incur damages from sensitive data leaks, 
with little to no options for recourse. In the mobile app environment, third-party 
services also track users without consent across multiple applications and the 
extent of third-party involvement remains largely invisible to the consumer. This 
section seeks to first identify the use cases of third-party libraries found in mobile 
applications. We then introduce media permissions that third parties inherit and 
identify instances where consumers lack control of their information. To that end, 
we identify data collection practices conducted by third parties that are invasive to 
the consumer’s rights and over-exceed the user’s privacy expectations.  
A. Third-Party Libraries 
Many mobile app developers rely on third-party services for a variety of purposes, 
including maintenance, analytics, social network integration, security, and, most 
notably, advertising.115 However, third-party libraries inherit the set of permissions 
requested by the host app, allowing them access to a wealth of valuable consumer 
data, often beyond what is needed to provide the expected service to the app 
developer.116 For instance, an application allowing location sharing may in turn 
allow the same set of location permissions to be automatically granted to the third-
party service embedded in its application code.117 If the same library is used by 
multiple applications, the third-party service can collect multiple streams of 
consumer data simultaneously from different apps while a mobile device is 
active.118 
 
 114. See SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT (2019). 
 115. Ziang Ma et al., LibRadar: Fast and Accurate Detection of Third-Party Libraries in Android Apps, in PROC. 
OF THE INT’L CONF. ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (2016). 
 116. FED. TRADE. COMM’N, supra note 75, at 19. 
 117. See Theodore Book & Dan S. Wallach, A Case of Collusion: A Study of the Interface Between Ad Libraries 
and Their Apps, in PROC. OF THE ACM WORKSHOP ON SECURITY & PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONE & MOBILE DEVICES (2013); see 
also Michalis Diamantaris et al., REAPER: Real-time App Analysis for Augmenting the Android Permission System, 
in CODASPY ‘19 (2019).   
 118. Vallina-Rodriguez, supra note 99, at 17. 
 ANJANETTE RAYMOND, JONATHAN SCHUBAUER, AND DHRUV MADAPPA 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 85 
These active libraries present negative consequences for consumer privacy.119 
Most third-party services operate in the background of a mobile device and do not 
provide any form of visual cue inside the app to notify the consumer that 
information is being collected.120 The general lack of transparency in mobile 
systems leaves the consumer with virtually zero means to identify the third-party 
services used by their active application, let alone to know what extent those 
service are able to collect, correlate, and aggregate with their personal 
information.121 As a result, consumers have no insight into how these services 
operate or how they handle sensitive data. Moreover, once the data leaves the 
device, a consumer is not provided any sufficient information explaining whether 
or not that third-party service sells the data to other third-parties.122 Despite past 
efforts by academics and regulators, there is still a clear deficiency of consumer 
protection rights provisioned in the mobile environment.123 A collective 
understanding of how companies coordinate their relationships and partnerships 
with third-parties, where they operate, and what their privacy data sharing policies 
are will need to be more clearly disclosed if the consumer has any hope of being 
provided sufficient means to protect their personal privacy.  
B. Third-Party Media Permissions 
The ubiquitous internet connectivity that mobile devices now offer has resulted in 
a drastic increase in mobile applications that rely on multimedia features.124 These 
features rely on high fidelity sensors found in many mobile devices. For example, a 
mobile device’s camera and microphone enable a user to capture pictures, video, 
and recorded audio files. Apps also utilize other services such as personal voice 
assistants, facial recognition, and fingerprint authentication.125  
These multimedia features are dictated by the permissions of the consumer to 
approve or deny functionality. While these media featured applications offer 
beneficial use cases to the consumer, apps using such features often violate 
consumer privacy expectations.126 When a consumer grants a multimedia 
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permission to an app, the designated permission also is applied to any third-party 
library Software Development Kit (“SDK”) package included in the app. Thus, 
consumers are unaware of the extent of privacy risks generated from the approved 
permissions they grant access to.127  
In addition, on both iOS and Android there is no permission required for third-
party code in an app to continuously record what is displayed on a consumer’s 
device.128 As such, consumers unwittingly use apps that are granting over-privileged 
permissions. For instance, an applications third-party library may collect video 
recordings containing sensitive information similar to session-replay scripts or 
browser tracking mechanisms on websites.129 Moreover, these libraries can 
accomplish this functionality without requiring any permission from the 
consumer.130 When applications are used, sensitive information is often displayed 
by default. In turn, undisclosed monitoring by third parties stealthily captures 
personal information of consumers while in session. Several apps also share image 
and video data if the permissions that granted functionality to a camera or device 
storage is allowed. For instance, several photo editing applications process photo 
images online in the background without explicit mentioning of such behavior in 
the privacy policy or to the consumer.131 
Consequently, large amounts of applications request multimedia permissions 
that are never used and include code that uses multimedia sensors without 
explicitly requesting such permissions to the consumer.132 This inconsistency 
violates consumer expectation, while increasing potential privacy risks. Even worse, 
previously unused permissions can be exploited by third-party libraries that a 
developer includes in an app.133 Third-party code that does not provide permissions 
to use multimedia in a version of an application may start exploiting any 
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TINKER (Nov. 15, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/11/15/no-boundaries-exfiltration-of-personal-
data-by-session-replay-scripts/. 
 130. See Christophe Leung et al., Should You Use the App for That?: Comparing the Privacy Implications of 
App- and Web-based Online Services, in PROC. OF THE INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONF. (2016). 
 131. See Elleen Pan et al., Panoptispy: Characterizing Audio and Video Exfiltration from Android Applications, 
in PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 1-18 (2018); see also Szymon Sidor, Exploring Limits of Covert Data 
Collection on Android: Apps can Take Photos with your Phone without you Knowing, EZ.AI (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.ez.ai/2014/05/exploring-limits-of-covert-data.html. 
 132. See id; see also Abbas Razaghpanah et al., Apps, Trackers, Privacy, and Regulators: A Global Study of 
the Mobile Tracking Ecosystem, in PROC. OF THE NETWORK & DISTRIBUTED SYS. SECURITY SYMPOSIUM (2018). 
 133. See W. Enck, P. Gilbert et al., Taintdroid: an information-ﬂow tracking system for realtime Privacy 
Monitoring on Smartphones, in PROC. OF THE 9TH USENIX SYMP. ON OPERATING SYSTEMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
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permissions granted to a future version of the app for an unrelated purpose. Such 
practices could impose additional privacy risks, since third-party libraries can 
potentially load additional code once a permission is granted without developers or 
consumers knowing.134 
Furthermore, there is an inconsistency between permissions and API calls found 
in an application’s intention of use.135 These problems lead to over-privileged 
permissions provisioned in large quantities of mobile apps. Therefore, there is a 
need for developers to more carefully consider how they request certain media 
functionality. For example, an application may have required permission in a 
previous version, however, the developer may have failed to update the requested 
permissions in the newer version of the app.136 Additionally, the mapping between 
the applications permissions and the APIs referenced may be poorly documented, 
leading to confusion among the development teams.137 Also, third-party software 
development kits provide copy-and-paste instruction for integration that includes 
all potentially needed permissions, even if the app does not use the embedded 
library to function.138  
C. Privacy Notices 
Privacy notices are intended to provide the consumer the opportunity to control 
their information and protect their privacy,139 but often times the consumer does 
not take the time to read the notices provided.140 The utility benefit of reading 
policy notices as opposed to the immediate gratification of skipping such 
statements and gaining access to services far exceeds how consumers make their 
choice. While privacy notices are produced to provide consumers the opportunity 
to control and protect their information, such notices are defective because 
consumers receive very little relevant information about the involvement of third-
party services.141 Adequate information that determines who your personal data is 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. Szymon Sidor, Exploring Limits of Covert Data Collection on Android: Apps can Take Photos with your 
Phone without you Knowing, EZ.AI (May 22, 2014), http://www.ez.ai/2014/05/exploring-limits-of-covert-
data.html. 
 136. See Pan, supra note 131, at 9. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, iii (2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (stating “the Commission’s goal in the privacy arena 
has remained constant: to protect consumers’ personal information and ensure that they have the confidence 
to take advantage of the many benefits of the ever-changing marketplace.”). 
 140. See id. (stating “the notice-and-choice model, as implemented, has led to long, incomprehensible 
privacy policies that consumers typically do not read, let alone understand.”). 
 141. See id. at 24 (“Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief of Center for Digital 
Democracy, U.S.PIRG, and World Privacy Forum, In the Matter of Real-time Targeting and Auctioning, Data 
 After Over-Privileged Permissions 
88 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
shared with and what purpose it is used for are basic levels of trustworthy 
disclosure company privacy notices should be willing to reveal.142 Technologist have 
created many types of different applications consumers can use as options to make 
sense of privacy notices and the flow of information, however, consumers are 
reluctant in effectively utilizing these technologies, and the most relevant devices 
are still underdeveloped.143 
Privacy notices can’t be improved until the U.S. privacy regime actively employs 
effective policy enforcement which requires companies to produce notices that 
reasonably allow the consumer to have controlled notice and choice to their 
personal information. Additionally, the public will need to take their privacy rights 
seriously. Fast acting design options implemented through sociotechnical 
enhancements can help simplify privacy notice information in a manner presented 
in a more easily understandable and less burdensome format for the consumer to 
read. Developers and technologist creating such technologies can help create 
incentives that allow consumers to more actively inform themselves about 
company notices and take their privacy rights seriously. The public will continue to 
suffer from the ambiguity we find in privacy notices until both legislative 
enforcement and sociocultural elements surrounding information privacy are 
improved. 
In order to implement effective notice and choice to the consumer, policy 
technologists and legislators must be willing to implement policies that address the 
exhaustive amount of criticisms surrounding notices consumers receive. On top of 
the notice issues consumers already experience, personal information is constantly 
being transferred from one international jurisdiction to another, with drastically 
different privacy laws at play. If there is any hope to improve third-party disclosure 
issues and consumer control, these criticisms must be addressed. Accordingly, if 
these criticisms are not realized, third-party members will continue to actively use 
and spread consumer information with very little concern to the consumer’s 
privacy. 
D. Notice Deficiency 
While many sources have noted that consumers do not read the entirety of notices, 
it is no secret that the majority of privacy notices are unreasonably long.144 
 
Profiling Optimization, and Economic Loss to Consumers and Privacy (2010), available at 
http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/eb/6c/eb6c038a1fb114be75ecabab05b4b90b/FTCfiling_Apr7_10.pdf.”). 
 142. See id. at 26–27 (stating “privacy policies have become long and incomprehensible, placing too high a 
burden on consumers to read, understand, and then exercise meaningful choices based on them.”). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See PATRICK GAGE KELLEY ET AL., STANDARDIZING PRIVACY NOTICES: AN ONLINE STUDY OF THE NUTRITION LABEL 
APPROACH 1 (2010), http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/_files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab09014.pdf (determining 
that “standardized privacy policy presentations can have significant positive effects on accuracy and speed of 
information finding and on reader enjoyment of privacy policies.”). 
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Researchers from Carnegie Mellon, Lorrie Cranor and Aleecia McDonald, collected 
privacy policies from the top 75 websites and calculated the median length of 
policies, with the results showing the median length to be 2,514 words.145 A 
standard reading rate in academic literature was assessed as being 250 words a 
minute, so assuming that the majority of consumers have standard reading levels 
of academics (which they don’t), then a privacy policy would cost the average 
person about 10 minutes to read.146 Professor Cranor then calculated the amount 
of time for the average person to read every privacy policy from every website out 
of the 75 sites analyzed.147 To accomplish this feat, it would take the average person 
a total of 25 days. If reading these policies were to be quantified from a 9:00 AM – 
5:00 PM job scenario, it would take the average person 76 workdays to complete 
the task.148 Nationally, the total amount of time implemented by all consumers was 
calculated at 53.8 billion hours (6,141,552 years) of time required.149 
The opportunity cost lost was even more staggering. Professor Cranor 
constructed a hypothetical opportunity cost nationally for reading internet privacy 
policies.150 The researchers first split up web surfing between home and work visits, 
valued the time spent reading privacy policies at two times a worker’s wage, and 
multiplied the time spent reading at home by one-quarter of average wages for 
home visitors.151 Professor Cranor calculated the hypothetical national net 
opportunity cost of reading privacy policies at $781 billion.152 For comparison, 
Google’s market cap value was $780 billion in July of 2019.153 Professor Cranor’s 
study was conducted in 2008, so there is little doubt that the number has only 
increased.154 These statistics alone show how fundamentally broken information 
privacy is. This data continues to add to the notion that the collective weight of 
policy length does not reasonably allow consumers to maintain responsible 
ownership of personal data. Third-party recipients will always be blanketed in 
dubious protections if the lengths of privacy notices given to the consumer are 
unreasonably long. 
 
 145. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: A J. L. & POL’Y FOR THE 
INFO. SOC’Y 543, 553–54 (2008). 
 146. See id at 554–55. 
 147. See id. at 562–63. 
 148. See id. at 563. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 561–62. 
 151. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: A J. OF L. & POL’Y FOR 
THE INFO. SOC’Y 543, 558–59, 561–62 (2008). 
 152. See id. at 544. 
 153. See Alphabet Market Cap, YAHOO, (Aug. 13, 2019, 12:07 AM), 
https://ycharts.com/companies/GOOG/market_cap. 
 154. See id. 
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IV. LEGAL MANEUVERS PROTECTING PRIVACY  
The United States lacks a single, comprehensive federal privacy law that regulates 
the collection and use of personal information. Instead, the U.S. privacy regime 
relies on regulating data protection with only certain sectoral laws at the federal 
and state level. A misplaced reliance on privacy torts has also created overlapping 
problems that further complicate the privacy law discussion. The United States 
approach to privacy laws fails to address consumer protection, and the related 
proposals leave these issues gaping. This section will briefly explore the U.S. Privacy 
Protections from the Federal and State level and will then explore several of the 
more promising areas of emerging regulation.  
A. Overview of U.S. Privacy Protections 
There are several adopted sectoral and state laws practiced within the U.S. that 
provide specific industry guidelines with different types of personal information. 
For example, sectoral laws include: The Fair Credit and Reporting Act (“FCRA”); The 
Gramm-Leah-Bliley Act; The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”); 
and The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”). However, if the company doesn’t 
fall within an often-narrow scope of sectoral coverage, the law is inapplicable to 
their activities. Hence, the limited coverage leaves gaps in regulation and often 
leaves individuals unprotected. 
1.  At the Federal Level 
While there are several federal sectoral based privacy laws within the U.S., many of 
the protections afforded to consumers under these laws are less than stellar. In fact, 
it is often the case that the limited scope of the law provides little-to-no protection 
for the consumer. For example, while individuals may assume the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) may cover the information contained 
on your IoT enabled Garmin or Fitbit device, in fact, only “covered entities” such as 
health plans, health care providers, and health care clearinghouses, fall within the 
regulation.155 Similarly, the FCRA only protects as private the information contained 
within the files of consumer reporting agencies. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also 
known as the Financial Modernization Act, requires financial institutions to explain 
company information-sharing practices to their consumers.156 As one can see, the 
majority of privacy-based protections are incredibly limited in scope–thereby 
leaving a large swath of individuals who fall outside these situations and 
environments unprotected. 
Moreover, even in the events that information is covered within one of these 
sectoral laws, the laws fail to protect information within the current data gathering 
 
 155. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, UNDERSTANDING HIPPA PRIVACY: FOR COVERED ENTITIES (2017). 
 156. See Federal Trade Comm’n, Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
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environment. For example, all of these industry-specific laws require “covered 
entities” to produce forms of notice and choice to consumers before providing 
collected consumer information to third-parties, with the notice and choice coming 
in the form of a blanketed opt-in/opt-out approach157 that is deficient (as described 
above).158 In situations such as this, the consumer is unaware and is in fact, often 
unable to discern  entities that will receive their information and has no real means 
of discovering how the entity will use the data.  This ambiguity, therefore, still leaves 
the consumer with little control over their personal information, despite being 
offered thoroughly produced privacy notices that followed strictly practiced, 
industry-specific guidelines.159 
Supplementary to federal sectoral laws, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
has privacy related enforcement powers arising when  companies engage in defined 
and proximate “unfair” or “deceptive” trade practices.160 Under this law, entities 
are prohibited from commercial conduct that: (1) causes (or is likely to cause) 
substantial injury to consumers; (2) that consumers cannot reasonably avoid 
themselves; and (3) without offsetting benefits to consumers or competition.161 As 
information technology continues to advance in business operations and 
advertising, what constitutes deceptive or unfair trade practices continues to 
evolve. For example, the failure to implement sufficient security measures or failure 
to adequately disclose information-handling practices have already given rise to 
enforcement action against companies.162  
Unfortunately, even federal enforcement authority fails to address the 
consumer’s lack of control or understanding of information provided in privacy 
notices.163 For example, the majority of enforcement activity is squished so long as 
the entity can demonstrate the existence of an opt-in/opt-out information sharing 
agreement. As previously discussed, these approaches often fail to provide 
adequate information to the consumer and provide no meaningful way to receive 
services once an opt-out is selected. As such, these agreements are widely used 
within industries and thereby leave little protections to consumers. 
 
 157. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6808 (2012). 
 158. See supra discussion accompanying notes 155–57. 
 159. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 50. 
 160. See PETER SWIRE & SOL BERMANN, INFORMATION PRIVACY 70 (2007). 
 161. Federal Trade Comm’n Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).   
 162. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Sears Settles FTC Charges Regarding Tracking Software (Jun. 4, 
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/sears.shtm (agreeing that Sears “failed to disclose adequately the 
scope of consumers’ personal information it collected via a downloadable software application.”). 
 163. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, GATEWAY LEARNING SETTLES FTC PRIVACY CHARGES (2004), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2004/07/gateway-learning-settles-ftc-privacy-charges 
(agreeing that Gateway “violated federal law when it rented consumers’ personal information to target 
marketers”). 
 After Over-Privileged Permissions 
92 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
2. At the State Level 
From an information privacy perspective, state statutory law also provides very 
little assistance to the consumer. With the exception of California’s “Shine the Light 
Law,” and the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”)164 no other state requires 
companies to provide consumers disclosure of information with their information-
sharing practices or a list of companies they share consumers information with for 
advertising purposes.165 So long as companies provide consumers with an opt-in or 
opt-out mechanism and the consumer is not a California resident, companies are 
not required by law to disclose the third-parties with which a company shares 
information with or provide access rights to the consumers they collect from.166   
Consequently, the majority of states in the United States do not even require 
companies to develop privacy policies or any kind of useful notice and choice the 
consumers may read.167 As previously mentioned, the most promising form of state 
statutory law can be exemplified with California’s “Shine the Light Law” and 
CCPA.168 California’s information privacy laws require companies to disclose their 
information-sharing practices to consumers and, if requested by the consumer,169 
companies are required to disclose consumers with a list of third-party members 
they have shared the consumer’s information with.170 Other notable state laws 
include Utah’s statutory adoptions,171 which require certain companies to disclose 
to consumers what type of information they may disclose to third-parties.172 
Connecticut has also required privacy policies to be posted in the event that entities 
collect social security numbers.173  
While these state laws are a step in the right direction for consumers’ 
information privacy, most of these state statues do not require notice and choice 
about the specific third-parties to be included in their privacy policies.174  Even if 
California’s “Shine the Light” statute does not mandate active third-party listing and 
 
 164. Examining Safeguards for Consumer Data Privacy Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & 
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 167. See Asay, supra note 165, at 341. 
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companies are exempt from this law if consumers are offered opt-in/opt-out 
options.175 Therefore, state privacy statutes barely scratch the surface in 
adequately protecting consumer’s privacy. The consumer is left virtually 
unprotected in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions.176  
Instead of comprehensive protection, the majority of states recognize privacy 
torts such as: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs; (2) 
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity which places a person 
in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of one’s name or likeness.177 
Some commentaries go so far as to claim that additional regulations would be 
unduly burdensome, with little-to-no real privacy benefits provided to the 
consumers.178 In contrast, some commentators and organizations argue that since 
almost every state recognizes privacy torts these tortious based rights are therefore 
the best hope for protecting consumer information privacy.179 They support this 
argument by highlighting the limitations of implementation at the socioeconomic 
or technical levels.180  
Unfortunately, as emphasized above, the advancement in technology and the 
insistence upon third-party permissions and misguided developer practices, 
imposes upon the consumer sharing expectations and reduces the options which a 
consumer can assert in opposition. In environments such as this, consumers are 
essentially left with no recourse at all.181 This is because, the standards currently 
established are outdated182 and are not able take into account the increasing 
advancements of technologies and how they affect information privacy.183 For 
example, Professor Asay emphasizes that “courts have been reluctant to recognize 
privacy torts in cases where the information collected was publicly available or 
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where a reasonable person would not be offended by the collection.”184 In these 
types of instances, however, the courts are neglecting the fact that database 
technology can store thousands of confidential pieces of information about a 
person in a profile, making it very easy for companies to share sensitive information 
with third-parties.185 
In some instances, courts have also adopted a view of consumer privacy 
differentiated as public or private,186 where some information is voluntarily 
public187 and other forms of information are viewed as private.188 The ambiguity 
between what is voluntarily private and public, however, is distorted as context 
matters in most of these instances. Moreover, as Professor Asay interjects, privacy 
torts rely on the concept of physical space to define expectations and harm.189 
Because of this viewpoint, “courts in applying privacy torts to the digitized world 
have largely neglected privacy harm that does not fit neatly into the old 
paradigm.”190 As a result, consumers are left to fend for themselves and even when 
they discover a potential avenue to protect their privacy the outcomes often fail to 
offer any true protection. 
B. Promising Legal Regulations 
Over the last decade privacy regulation has changed markedly. Policymakers have 
been forced to design privacy and data protection laws that are flexible to the 
unforeseen advancements of technology. Most notably, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and CCPA are two globally impactful laws that are 
creating sweeping changes toward consumers privacy rights. The GDPR, which 
began enforcement last year, enhances data protection and privacy rights for 
individuals within the European Union (“EU”) and European Economic Area (“EEA”). 
Like the GDPR, the CCPA is an American law aimed at providing control of personal 
data to California residents and will go into effect by January 1, 2020. Both 
regulations provide the consumer with better means of control over their personal 
data. The cascading impacts of both the GDPR and CCPA continue to change the 
U.S. privacy law regime on a global scale, leading to numerous laws being passed 
and multinational organizations elevating privacy to a board level issue. Privacy is 
all over the media and it is hard to dispute the role that the GDPR and CCPA have 
played in sustaining the privacy law conversation. Among tech companies, it has 
become common knowledge that to ignore privacy is to risk reputation and leave 
the organization in the competitive dark ages. Moreover, the regulations introduce 
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serious fines that companies must now consider with their data collection practices. 
Furthermore, both laws present promising outcomes for the future of consumer 
privacy rights.  
1. GDPR 
The GDPR is a new data protection directive that builds upon the European Data 
Protection Directive191 and implements new models of privacy and data protection 
law. While the Data Protection Act previously sought out how personal information 
was used by companies, government entities, and other organizations,192 the GDPR 
now changes how personal information can be used. Individuals, organizations, and 
companies who are defined as either “controllers”193 or “processors”194 of personal 
information are held accountable for their information collection practices, 
including the requirement of the completion of a data protection impact 
assessments and accurate explanations of how data is collected and processed.195  
Moreover, the GDPR requires concise and clear information to be provided about 
consent, thereby requiring a “positive opt-in”196 option for the consumers. 
Garnering the most attention are the provisions relating to the consumers ability to 
request all information that a company holds about them197 and the “Right to Be 
 
 191. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
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controller. Data processor activities must be governed by a binding contract or other legal act with regard to 
the controller. The contract should set out the subject matter, duration, nature and purpose of the processing, 
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Processors can only process personal data on instructions from the controller. Upon termination of the 
agreement with the controller, processors must return or destroy personal data at the choice of the controller. 
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 195. See id. 
 196. Id. at art. 5–10, Recitals 39–48, 69, 70 (explaining that the GDPR provides data subjects with a right to 
withdraw consent at any time as well as a right to object if their personal data is processed on the basis of 
legitimate interest or performing of a task in the public interest); see GDPR Art. 21 Recitals 69, 70. 
 197. Id. at art. 12, 15, 20, 21 Recitals 59, 63, 64 (explaining that the GDPR states that, when responding to 
an access request, a data controller must indicate the purposes of the processing; the categories of personal 
data concerned; the recipients or categories of recipients to whom personal data have been disclosed to; and 
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Forgotten” provision which requires a company to delete all information about an 
individual upon request.198 
Unlike other reviewed legislative enactments, the GDPR implements harsher 
fines that empower regulators to enforce compliance.199 For example, the 
Commission Nationale De l’informatique (“CNIL”), France’s data protection 
regulator, issued a $56.8 million fine against Google for violating user’s “genuine 
consent” standards.200 As can be seen, the penalties can run into the millions of 
dollars and can include a penalty based upon worldwide revenue.201  
2. California Consumer Privacy Act 
The CCPA enhances privacy rights and consumer protection for California residents 
as it applies to any business organization with annual gross revenues greater than 
$25 million that does business in California.202 Under the CCPA, consumers have the 
following rights: (1) the right to know what personal data is being collected about 
them; (2) the right to know if their personal data is sold or disclosed; (3) the right to 
know if their personal data is being sold, to whom it is being sold to; (4) the right to 
deny permission of sale of their personal data; (5) the right to access their personal 
data; (6) the right to access to equal service and price, regardless of whether they 
exercise their privacy rights or not.203 
According to the CCPA, personal data is any information that “identifies, relates 
to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, 
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directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”204 The CCPA differs 
from the GDPR in that the GDPR classifies consumer information as personal only.  
In contrast the CCPA extends its definition to households.205 The GDPR also extends 
to all EU citizens while the CCPA only extends to California residents.206  
Under the CCPA, consumers also have legal grounds to sue any businesses that 
violate the bill.207 Businesses that violate the CCPA are fined up to $7,500 for each 
intentional violation208 and $2,500 for each unintentional violation under Section 
1798.155 of the Civil Code.209  Like the GDPR, the CCPA will have significant global 
impact, given that California boast the world’s fifth-largest economy. Together, the 
two regulations aim to guarantee individuals greater control over their personal 
data, while providing the consumer with rights to have access to their information.  
V. LEGAL-TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS  
Consumers have become increasingly cautious about providing information to 
companies, due to the prospect of companies misusing or mishandling their 
sensitive information.210 With privacy rights becoming prioritized due to recent 
regulation, companies have responded with joining privacy “seal” programs such as 
“as TrustE,211 and privacy alliances such as the Online Privacy Alliance.212 These best 
practices typically require companies to produce notices to consumers informing 
them how the company collects information, how the company will use it, and what 
type of third-parties will have access to consumer information. While these industry 
practices seem reasonable and considerate to the consumer’s privacy, Professor 
Asay states that there are two drawbacks to self-regulated industry practices: 
adequacy and enforcement.213 Companies possess a self-interest in retaining 
flexibility with consumer information.214 Therefore, a company’s self-regulatory 
approach often varies with effectiveness in providing consumers with adequate 
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protection and control of their information. Self-regulation also relies on companies 
regulating their own behavior,215 and not all self-regulating practices are created 
equal. 
Even companies who attempt to implement best practices with privacy 
information struggle with providing consumers with adequate information control. 
Self-Regulating practices are still plagued with ambiguous, blanketed legal language 
and unidentified third-parties who can still utilize consumer information.216 From a 
consumer’s point of view, consumers receiving notice and choice should adequately 
be supplied with who is receiving their information and how the company plans to 
use it. Instead, consumers are presented with the general notice that unidentified 
third-parties will legally receive and use personal information in manners 
unknown.217 While self-regulation helps provide incentives for companies to 
practice safe handling of privacy information, it still offers little control to 
consumers in receiving appropriate knowledge of where their information is going 
and how third-parties will use it. 
In instances where self-regulation continues to leave consumers unprotected it 
is likely time that more consideration is given to regulating portions of the data and 
digital marketplaces. While widespread announcements of warnings, such as with 
the newest issues surrounding FaceApp,218 can be effective the release highlights a 
potential solution that is often unexplored.  The marketplace in which the app was 
approved and released is in no way insisting upon any privacy or protections from 
developers or third parties. One wonders how long the absence of a commitment 
to self-regulation will continue to be ignored as a gap in governance–thereby 
demanding regulation. Free or not, app environments are a marketplace, and thus 
can be regulated as such. Individuals have demonstrated again and again that they 
are unable, or unwilling, to gauge real harms. Nonetheless, regulation has long been 
argued as an appropriate response to the harms. Of course, this regulation is only 
the tip of the iceberg in terms of resolving harms suffered, yet this area is both ripe 
for regulation and a good first step in addressing harms to both individuals and 
other harms suffered by society in a digital eco-system.  
Regulation in this area will likely be larger than the area addressed in this paper, 
as the issues of notice, consent, and design are much wider issues. Without a doubt, 
we should consider regulation which holds those in control of the marketplace to a 
standard of safe product, in which the product is certified (and truly is) attentive to 
privacy, consent, and notice. In addition, any attempt to regulate must be managed 
via a polycentric approach, in which multiple agencies and individuals have the 
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ability to enforce regulation and seek redress. Finally, there is mounting evidence 
that individual designers wish to be given protections for revealing design and 
deployments that violate the basic expectations of the users and society as a whole. 
Accordingly, it is time that we support such disclosures through well designed 
whistleblower protections.  
A. Sociotechnical Solutions  
In the absence of regulation imposing requirements, technology developers are 
attempting to create technology driven solutions to address the harms suffered in 
a digital marketplace. Notice Deficiency limitation has influenced technologists to 
create devices that offer consumers easier methods of employing choice to privacy 
notices. Professor Haddadi’s Databox proposed a piece of technology mitigating the 
lack of choice prevalent from vague third-party disclosures found in policy 
notices.219  
The Databox offers the consumer a trusted platform that facilitates data 
management, controlled access against other parties wishing to use consumer data, 
and support incentive to both consumers and information collectors.220 The 
Databox platform enables consumers to coordinate the collection of personal data, 
while selectively controlling and monitoring their data for their own specific 
purposes.221 It also employs three provisions that assist the consumer with these 
controls: (1) legibility to inspect and reflect what data is being collected and how it 
is processed, (2) agency to manage data and access it whenever the consumer sees 
fit, and (3) negotiability to navigate the data’s social aspects with the interaction of 
data subjects and the aligned policies.222 All of these control mechanisms are 
developed and deployed through the components of MirageOS, Irmin, and Signpost 
methodologies.  
The Databox is simply providing a consumer the means to understand, control, 
and negotiate access to the collection of their own data. Professor Haddadi’s 
technology does not implement shortened privacy notices, but does empower the 
consumer to be able to freely monitor and access the collection of their own data.223 
This piece of developmental technology becomes relevant due to the fact that 
consumers are aware of where their data is going and how it may be used.224 While 
the notice length hasn’t changed, consumers can potentially acknowledge what 
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information third-parties have access to and where that information may be 
traveling. The Databox remains in development.225 
Further developments to privacy notice efficiency can be found in app design.226 
To mitigate the ongoing problem of privacy notice length, application designers are 
creating fast-acting implementations that offer consumers shortened, summarized 
versions of the privacy policies.227 These summarized versions of notices give the 
consumer a chance to understand the agreement they are “consenting” to without 
spending unreasonable amounts of time reading privacy notices they may not 
understand. The app designers employ these design elements by addressing privacy 
notices with a checklist to the consumer.228 The consumer is offered the privacy 
notice in the form of summarized bullet-points that display relevant content about 
privacy practices. The consumer is then offered a checklist to agree with each 
summarized privacy practice.229 
Following the checklist, the consumer is then immediately offered the chance to 
enhance special privacy controls. These types of design applications not only make 
privacy notices easy for the consumers to understand, but also allow the consumer 
to have reasonable notice regarding data collection practices. Summarized policy 
application features address the lack of control experienced by consumers and 
provide the consumer with reasonable amounts of information that the consumer 
can understand. These design implications are relevant to third-party disclosure 
because they are reinforcing the willingness of the consumer to read the notices 
provided since the information is of adequate length. Consumers are not burdened 
by the feelings of helplessness, confusion, or anxiety that is typically generated by 
the information overload found in traditional privacy notices. Instead, the 
consumers receive a concise understanding of the information presented, with a 
realistic overview that produces a chance for the consumer to make an appropriate, 
educated decision with their personal data. 
To mitigate the underlying lack of consumer choice in privacy notices, the 
traditional means of documenting communication in commerce is being 
superseded by multiple instances of electronic agreement,230 rather than just one 
singular signature agreement required by the user. In the view of some scholars, 
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documents are assessed to merely be containers.231 Documents have always been 
semantically boxed with large collections of information. The documents 
themselves are not the most important properties to a consumer, but rather, the 
content that lies within.232 While this observation is obvious, large collections of 
information contained in a document make it challenging for relevant content to be 
found. Instead of employing the traditional approach where the consumer signs an 
entire document and thereby verifies all of the policy disclosures content to a third-
party recipient, Professor Bull introduces a fragment extraction policy through the 
use of privacy enhancing Content Extraction Signatures (“CES”).233 Professor Bull’s 
method enables consumers to view various portions of a privacy notice, where the 
consumer may sign only the parts of the document he/she agrees with.  
The standardization of CES empowers the consumer with reasonable choice. The 
document is not verified by consumers in one signature and the blanketed opt-
in/opt-out methods companies hide are more challenging to insert. The CES 
method allows the consumers to be selective in what they are agreeing to and 
providing some control in what they are signing. 
B. Personally Identifiable Information 
Technological innovations that provide easier means of control and choice to 
consumer’s privacy information will not be effective until federal and state laws are 
adequately enforced. The current U.S. privacy regime is lacking sufficient 
protections to consumer’s privacy and third-party disclosures are too loosely 
regulated. Furthermore, laws requiring companies to provide sufficient notice and 
choice to the consumers describing the intended third-party recipients and their 
collection uses must be introduced. Consumers must also be uniformly entitled to 
privacy as a right with options of recourse to protect their privacy interests under 
the law.  
Currently suggested proposals only apply to PII that companies collect and offer 
to third-party recipients.234 Companies do not aggregate, anonymized information 
(“non-PII”).235 There is an unclear notion that third-party recipients could easily use 
non-PII to cause consumers potential objective privacy harms. These concerns 
extend to the possibility of re-identification.236 For instance, a study involving a 
group of 10,000 anonymized twitter users were successfully re-identified using a 
“Supervised Learning Algorithm.” This algorithm was able to re-identify the 
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anonymized twitter users with 97.6% accuracy.237 Despite industry efforts to 
properly anonymize consumer information, computational programs were still able 
to re-identify these records with accuracy and could potentially aggregate and re-
purpose such information.238 As demonstrated in this study, anonymization 
techniques still remain in early development and don’t guarantee identity perfect 
anonymization to consumers’ data. Since the risks of objective privacy harm are 
more challenging to access with non-PII, the manner in which non-PII is governed 
should be regulated differently.239 
Additionally, since subjective privacy harm is sometimes unavoidable, and harms 
vary to the levels of extreme sensitivities, legitimate issues that show subjective 
harm are much harder to address. As previously mentioned, Professor Asay argues 
that in order for subjective harm to be legitimate, objective privacy harm must also 
be a potential possibility.240 As such, he asserts that arguably this “type of harm is 
unavoidable and results more from the extreme sensitivities of a few than a 
legitimate issue needing redress.”241 The elements of this discussion assess non-PII 
as information that cannot be reversed engineered or linked back to consumers.242 
Following on in this argument, Professor Asay argues that one underlying issue 
of privacy is the clarity of what constitutes PII. The EU Directive defines “personal 
data” in broad terms:  
Personal data shall mean any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.243 
This interpretation suggests that personal data may not be necessary to identify 
a person from related information, under the premise that information is relatable 
to an identifiable person. For many legislators, the definition of PII is too broad. The 
California Data Security Breach Act attempts to narrow PII by clarifying personal 
information as the name of an individual who is associated with multiple forms of 
sensitive information.244 While the California law does offer a specific definition, the 
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interpretation only addresses certain types of objective privacy harms. A legislative 
proposal addressing both extremes of privacy harms that could impact consumers 
must be offered to effectively regulate privacy.245  Consequently Professor Asay 
asserts, “the definition thus focuses the model law on the two forms of privacy 
harm”246 thereby rejecting excessive detail while respecting the existing definition 
of PII.247   
In further discussion of PII, there are some instances where third-party 
disclosures should not be applicable to legal solicitation. For example, Professor 
Asay argues “the law should not apply to government actors pursuing PII as part of 
an investigation.”248 Instead “the law should only apply if the company disclosed 
the PII to the third party for a secondary use of the information: a use beyond the 
purposes for which the individual provided the PII.” 249 
Subsequently, legal scholars have proposed that the definition of the term 
“personally identifiable information” should also encapsulate more static digital 
identifiers. Additional digital identifiers could extend toward GPS coordinates, 
Android ID’s, and unique device identifiers as being definitively included as PII and 
not solely interpreted as such.250 According to Professor McAllister, a more 
contextual definition is needed to take into account static digital identifiers as being 
characterized as “personally identifying” when the “particular recipients” of the 
data are likely to identify a consumer.251 This would mean that courts would be 
forced to more directly consider the full extent of particular disclosures.252 The 
definition would focus more on the specific recipient and question the ability to 
identify a user issue based on the “particular” digital identifier.253 Thus, courts 
would be more focused on the discovery to be assessed with the identification 
question. With such changes, courts would have a better understanding of when 
the statutory definition applies in the discovery identification process.  
The suggested definitions to PII provides legislators with a clear explanation of 
delimiting third-party intent. In the defined instances, interpretation of PII is taking 
into consideration the initial flow of information taken in by companies and setting 
appropriate guidelines to the transfer of use by third-party recipients. The definition 
also addresses privacy harms in specific manners that are not too broad.  By 
reassuring consumers that their PII is disclosed for their own consented purposes, 
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and not to unrelated third-party recipients, the instance of subject privacy harm is 
likely reduced. Objective privacy harm would also be reduced because fewer third-
party recipients would be eligible to collect PII in their systems. 
C. Legislative Reconstruction 
Under the condition that Personally Identifiable Information is definitively adopted 
in the scope of law in the manner previously suggested, policy remedies could 
effectively be implemented to empower the consumer with control and choice. 
Such policy remedies should also resemble the standards imposed in the “Shine the 
Light” law and the rights provisioned by the CCPA at the national level. The FTC 
could stipulate provisions that require companies to provide consumers with a 
third-party recipient list before a company shares PII with its third-party vendors. 
Moreover, such provisions would provide the consumer with simple means of 
tracing the involvement of other companies who may be collecting their personal 
information.254 A third-party recipient list requirement, would also provide the 
consumer with  a more reasonable degree of notice that is accessible and not buried 
in vague third-party disclosure language.  
Furthermore, a provision requiring third-party recipients in short, summarized 
forms could also be included and be concurrent to third-party lists. The FTC could 
work with industries to develop these summaries to provide the most relevant 
description of information sharing practices and apply such practices to app 
transparency.  By doing so, the harmonization of policy languages between 
information-sharing practices of the company and the consumer are mutually 
comprehensible.255 These standards provide consumers with enhanced opportunity 
to limit the spread of their information, while limiting privacy harms that could 
occur from the unknown use of their personal data. 
Specifically, in the app markets, companies that host apps and dictate developer 
requirements could also require app developers to list their ad library packages in 
similar fashion to the way Dangerous Permissions are already listed in the 
applications descriptions in the Google Play Store. Such simple means of 
transparency would provide the consumer with a reasonably accessible means of 
understanding what parties are involved in the background collection of their data 
when using a mobile application. Furthermore, states should collectively adopt 
standards similar to the “Shine the Light” California law and provisioned rights of 
the CCPA. App developers are not required by law to list Third-Party involvement 
or provide consumers with access rights in their applications and will not willing do 
so until regulation requires such practices. 
Forty-nine out of the fifty states do not require companies to provide consumers 
disclosure of information with their information-sharing practices or a list of 
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companies they share consumers information with for advertising purposes.256 As 
long as companies provide consumers with an opt-in or opt-out option, companies 
are not required by law to disclose the third-parties with which a company shares 
or may share consumer PII. If states uniformly adopted legislation similar to 
California’s “Shine the Light Law,” companies would be held to standards that 
adequately provide the consumer the chance to receive notice and at least have 
some sort of choice before providing their consent. 
Globally, it is deemed an impossible task to reasonably track the flow of 
consumer information transferred from one party to another. It is unrealistic and a 
waste of resources, effort, and time to try and pursue such an endeavor. The way 
in which proper privacy control and notice can be adequately provided to the 
consumer is through the adoption of national privacy law as opposed to the mixture 
of state-by-state privacy legislation and sectoral law. The best way to empower 
individuals with proper control and notice to personal information is through the 
refinement of U.S. privacy laws that regulate technological practices at scale. Laws 
such as the GDPR and CCPA, force refinement of industry standards and present 
enough regulatory enforcement incentives–ensuring that tech firms take the 
requirements of the law seriously.  
While the GDPR and CCPA are by no means perfect, these types of privacy 
regulations are the correct steps forward and they force businesses to comply if 
they want to conduct business in these specific jurisdictions. Similar principles to 
the GDPR need to be adopted nationally if we are to create a society that still 
respects the right to privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Within the mobile ecosystem, applications are collecting personal information that 
violate consumer privacy expectations. In these instances, most applications 
operate as over-privileged to their core function(s). Many applications in both iOS 
and Android operate as over-privileged, by way of their third-party services 
embedded in their source code. While these third parties are often times 
benevolent, there is no notification provided to the consumer to notify who is 
collecting or what is being transferred. Even worse, there are severely limited 
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protections for U.S. citizens to have a choice or any control over their personal 
information.  
Additionally, companies do not offer reasonable notice or choice in privacy 
disclosures that adequately inform their consumers about their information-sharing 
practices. This article has identified these problems in legislation, multiparty 
involvement, privacy harms, disclosure formatting, and policy language that is 
inaccessible to the reasonable understanding of the average consumer. The current 
U.S. approach to privacy information remains ineffective in providing the consumer 
with appropriate levels of protections or choice of who can collect their personal 
information and how it will be used. Consumers continue to lack virtually any kind 
of real control over their collection of their information. 
As a result of this lack of control, consumers face subjective and objective privacy 
harms with very few options for legal recourse. Consumers willingly surrender their 
privacy to third parties with insufficient information regarding who receives their 
personal data and for what purposes it is used. Companies continue to blanket 
third-party involvement with opt-in/opt-out options and excessive policy lengths 
that render consumer notice impossible to reasonably understand. With respect to 
third-party disclosures, legislation is too loosely regulated and will need to be 
remedied before any kind of adequate notice and choice can be presented to the 
consumer. 
Technological tools and legislative remedies offer options and the possibility for 
reasonable notice and choice in the app environment, however, until government 
makes the effort to enact effective information privacy laws current to the digital 
information age, these potential solutions will only remain useful suggestions. The 
right to privacy will only continue to erode as information technology becomes 
progressively more advanced. The traditional approach to information-sharing 
practices has been proven to be ineffective and will remain so until legislation is 
current and flexible with technological capabilities, resembling the GDPR directive. 
An unorthodox approach to consumer protection and collective legislation flexible 
with technological advancements of permissions will need to be adopted globally if 
consumers have any hope of controlling their information. Until that change is 
actively pursued, the disparity of consumer’s personal information lays unbound by 
the unrestricted spread of multiparty collection in the mobile environment. 
 
